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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Products Liability: Strict Liability in Tort Applied to Both
Automobile Manufacturer and Retailer-Six weeks after purchasing
a new automobile, the plaintiff, while driving along a freeway, lost
control of the car, swerved off the highway, and collided with a light
post. An expert on the operation of hydraulic brakes testified that
the brakes applied themselves owing to a defective master cylinder
which did not allow the hydraulic fluid to escape after the brake
pedal was released. The California Supreme Court, in Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co.,' held both the manufacturer and the retailer strictly
liable in tort.
Ford, the manufacturer, contended that it could not be held strictly
liable in tort without proof that the car was defective when Ford placed
it on the market. The car was handled at various times by three author-
ized Ford dealers. But the court spurned the argument:
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc ..... we held that 'A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being.' Since the liability is strict it encompasses defects regard-
less of their source, and therefore a manufacturer of a com-
pleted product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect to a
component part supplied by another.
2
Ford replied that the product was not sold in the condition in which
it was expected to reach the hands of the consumer because it was
understood that the dealer would make all final inspections, corrections,
and adjustments necessary to make the car ready for use. But the court
held that
since Ford, as the manufacturer of a completed product, cannot
delegate its duty to have its cars delivered to the ultimate pur-
chaser free from dangerous defects, it cannot escape liability on
the ground that the defect in Vandermark's car may have been
caused by something one of its authorized dealers did or failed
to do.8 (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the court held the retailer strictly liable in tort also, dis-
regarding the dealer's warranties in the process:
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of
distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the
overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products. . . . [T]he
fact that it restricted its contractual liability to Vandermark is
immaterial. Regardless of the'obligations it assumed by contract,
it is subject to strict liability in tort, because it is in the business
of selling automobiles, one of which proved to be defective and
137 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P. 2d 168 (1964).
2 Id. at 898, 391 P. 2d at 170.
3 Id. at 899, 391 P. 2d at 171.
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caused injury to human beings. The requirement of timely notice
is not applicable to such tort liability.4 (Emphasis added.)
In Vandermark, the California court saliently reemphasizes the
doctrine of strict liability first pronounced in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,- and further extends this precept to include the retailer
as well as the manufacturer. Following right on the heels of Greenman
and Vandermark is the American Law Institute, which has recently
extended strict liability in tort beyond any product intended "for inti-
mate bodily use"6 and now applies liability without fault to any seller
"who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property .... "7 (Emphasis added.)
There have been other recent cases of great importance in the strict
liability field,' but none that have rid themselves so completely of the
confusing semantics of implied warranty and negligence as Vandermark
and Greenman have done. This article will juxtapose Vandermark with
Tentative Draft No. 10 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and ana-
lyze the two in an attempt to discover the apparent guide lines of this
obvious shift from negligence and commercial warranty law to strict lia-
bility.
Vandermark, Greenman, and Tentative Draft No. 10 are based
exclusively on the principle of strict liability, presumably stemming
from the broad socio-economic policy of risk-spreading. 9 Risk-
spreading demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those best able to
bear it. The seller can theoretically best shoulder the burden because
the extra cost can be compensated for either by acquiring liability in-
surance or by passing it on to all consumers in the form of higher
prices. 10 The straining of implied warranty beyond its commercial and
contract law limitations cannot accommodate the risk-spreading philoso-
4 Id. at 899, 900, 391 P. 2d at 171, 172.
5 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), where the manufacturer
of a combination power tool (note: a non-food product not intended for inti-
mate bodily use) was held strictly liable in tort when a piece of wood which
the plaintiff was working on suddenly flew out and struck him in the forehead.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402a (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
7Id. (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
8 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81, 240
N.Y.S. 2d 592 (1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154. So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1963) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F. 2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Gottsdanker
v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960), to name a few.
9 The philosophy of risk-spreading is generally identified with Justice Traynor's
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150
P. 2d 436, 441 (1944) ; see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.
J. 1099, 1120-24 (1960) ; Keeton, Products Liabilitym--Liability Without Fault
and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855, 856 (1963) ; and Noel,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964).10 But see Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. Rxv. 938 (1957), where the
author argues that certain competitive situations may prevent the manufacturer
from passing on the cost incurred by the imposition of risk-spreading upon him.
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phy for many reasons." First and foremost, the courts cannot arbi-
trarily or completely dispose of the requirement of privity, which is
fundamental to commercial transactions.' 2 Also, tort liability does not
require any reliance on the part of the consumer upon the skill, judg-
ment, or reputation of the seller, nor any representation or undertaking
on the part of the seller. Tort liability is not governed by limitations
of the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, or other
restrictions of warranty law such as timely notice of breach, definitions
of "sale," "buyer," and "seller," scope and content of warranties, dis-
claimers,'1 3 and the validity of the contract. Negligence cannot justify
risk-spreading because it is inherent in the risk-spreading principle
that fault is not an element of the defendant's liability. It is therefore
apparent that the definition of products liability would be considerably
improved if one of the three areas of liability mentioned briefly above
were uniformly accepted; and it is also apparent that strict liability
in tort may best disentangle the present morass of products liability
law.
In basing liability on tort principles, two primary questions regard-
ing the components of liability immediately present themselves. The
first is: What is a "defective product"? Vandermark is not subtle here,
because the brakes were clearly defective. No one could have operated
those brakes safely at the time of the injury. Under the Restatement,
the product is defective when it is "unreasonably dangerous"; that is,
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics."'14
Implicit in the Restatement's phrase "contemplation of the ordinary
consumer" are at best two limiting factors. First, some products are
commonly known to involve a degree of hazard, especially if imprudently
used. This approach prompts the Restatement to exclude "good tobacco"
from the class of unreasonably dangerous products, for "good tobacco
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking
" Prosser states that all the court is doing when it imposes liability in implied
warranty is affixing tort liability as a matter of policy. Prosser, supra note 9, at
1134.
12 See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 153-55 (1957),
for a list of techniques which the courts have devised to hurdle the privity bar-
rier.
13 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960),
where the court regarded the limitations of the express warranty as "so inim-
ical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity." However,
contrast the very recent case of Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 137 S.E. 2d 225,
231 (1964), where the court said: "[T]here can be no doubt that this language
of the express warranty ... clearly and conclusively precludes the [purchaser]
from maintaining this action: '. . this warranty being expressly in lieu of all
other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities
on its part...."
14 R5sTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402a, comment i (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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may be harmful."15 Contrast Green v. American Tobacco Co.,16 in
which the court applied the risk-spreading rationale in its full scope:
[A] manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity
for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly
irrelevant to his liability on the theory of implied warranty....
[To so hold] would be to shift to the purchaser the risk of what-
ever latent defectiveness may ultimately be proven by experience
and advancement of human knowledge, a risk which we are con-
vinced was from the inception of the implied warranty doctrine
intended to be attached tothe mercantile functionIT
Green clearly conflicts with the earlier case of Lartigue v. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. 8 where the manufacturer's liability was confined to fore-
seeable risks, not unknowable ones.
A second limitation in the Restatement's declaration of non-liability
for manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products (e.g., the Pasteur
treatment for rabies) and experimental drugs.' 9 The American Law
Institute feels that such products, which because of a lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience are "quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended or ordinary use," are not defective
or unreasonably dangerous so long as they are properly prepared and
accompanied by proper directions and warnings.20 This is an apparent
rejection of Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories,21 in which the manu-
facturer was held liable for defective polio vaccine.
The second major question which presents itself is: Must the product
be "defective" at the time it leaves the manufacturer's hands? Many
cases will arise in which further processing of a product sold before
it comes into the hands of the consumer is expected to occur. In stating
that the manufacturer has a non-delegable duty to make its products
free from dangerous defects, Vandermark applies a concept rarely used
in personal tort law.22 However, a similar use of the notion of non-
delegable duty has been recently expressed in a New York case:
"[T]here are some breaches of duty which create a continuing condi-
tion of hazard to users, very much like an enjoinable nuisance, which
may ground a cause of action short of the harm having yet occurred.1 23
Such a product may in effect become a "traveling nuisance."
The bone of contention in the cases involving unfinished products
is: Has the responsibility for discovery and prevention of the defect
'5 Ibd.
26 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
'7 Id. at 170, 173.
28 317 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
Is RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402a, comment k (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
20 Ibid.
216 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960).
2257 C.J.S. Master and Servant §591 (1948); 28A WORDS AND PHRASES 339
(1955) ("nondelegable duty").
23 Singer v. Walker, 250 N.Y.S. 216 (1964).
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been transfered to the intermediate party who is expected to finish the
processing? Vandermark states that the manufacturer has a non-dele-
gable duty to see that the product is fit for use.24 However, Tentative
Draft No. 10 expressly refrains from commenting on liability for
unfinished products 2 5 Pertinent here are the component-parts cases,
which offer the same problem of shifting responsibility in converse fash-
ion. 26 In both situations, the defect can be traced to the actions of a
third party. In Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis,27 the car manufacturer was
held liable for injuries caused to the plaintiff by a defective dimmer
switch supplied to Ford by an independent manufacturer. The court
applied section 400 of the Restatement, which provides that "one who
puts out as his product a chattel manufactured by another is subject
to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer. '28 Vander-
mark, in effect, turns these component parts cases inside out. Query:
Does Vandernmark extend the principle of non-delegable duty to all who
traffic in commodities, in spite of the fact that they have in no way con-
tributed to the potential defect?
There are several other interesting questions posed by Vandermark.
Did the fact that the retailer assumed the obligation of making the
final inspection enter into the decision of the court to hold the retailer
strictly liable? Has the problem of circuitous actions been solved, or can
the retailer, sued by an injured plaintiff, sue the manufacturer in in-
demnity or something akin to it? Can the manufacturer, sued by an
injured plaintiff, sue the retailer, or join him as a co-defendant and
force him to share the burden? Will all the sellers involved in the
eventual sale of a defective product be liable inter sese for a portion of
the damages, presumably as joint-tortfeasors ?
Finally, while it is apparent that under strict liability fault has no
application to manufacturers, it certainly retains defensive applicability
because the liability is strict, not absolute. Assumption of risk will in
all likelihood be the leading defense in those jurisdictions that adopt
strict liability.29 However, what would be the leading defense in Wis-
consin ?3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has abolished the defense of
24 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899, 391 P. 2d at 171.
2 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402a, comment p (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
28 See Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 193
(1961).27 322 F. 2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
28 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §400 (Supp. 1948).
29 Keeton, supra note 9, at 873.
3 Wisconsin still requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty cases, but notice
of its impending abolishment was given in Strahlendorf v. Walgreen, 16 Wis.
2d 421, 435, 114 N.W. 2d 823, 831 (1962), when the court stated that while
privity was a requisite, "this does not mean that this court will adhere to the
rule forever.... [W]e do not deem the instant case a proper one in which to
give consideration to this question." Thus, Wisconsin is fully aware of the
liberalizing trend evolving around it, but given the "proper case," it is sheer
speculation as to how far the court will go in light of Tentative Draft No.
10 and recent decisions such as Vandermark.
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assumption of risk in all cases except those of express consent.3' There-
fore, the only similar alternative would be contributory negligence.
However, under the comparative negligence statute32 contributory
negligence is no longer a complete bar to recovery, but must be com-
pared with the negligence of the defendant.33 But how can fault be com-
pared with non-fault? The defense of contributory negligence is only
applied when the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, has been negli-
gent.34 Yet, at the same time, justice demands that a plaintiff should
be barred from recovery when he has proceeded willfully or negligently
to use a product and suffered injury, after he has discovered the defect
and is aware of the danger. It is interesting to ponder how Wisconsin
would solve this problem.
In summation, the advent of strict liability has come upon the
courts very rapidly, and more decisions can be expected in the near
future. Dean Prosser has stated that "with the exception of the change
in the law with respect to prenatal injuries, this is the most radical and
spectacular development in tort law during this century." 35 Yet, strict
liability is not a panacea. In reality, it probably raises as many prob-
lems as it solves. The assuagement, however, lies in the fact that strict
liability in tort stands a good chance of being uniformly adopted by
the courts. Universal agreement on a single theory of liability will serve
to ameliorate and mollify the existing confusion resulting from a
multitudinous variety of bases on which liability is currently founded.
MICHAEL W. Wmcox
Sales: Uniform Commercial Code: Section 2-318 and Its Effect
on the Requirement of Privity-Plaintiff, employed as manager of a
hotel, personally purchased from a state liquor store, on behalf of his
employer, four bottles of champagne produced and bottled by the de-
fendant corporation. The wine was intended for use and consumption
by the guests of the hotel. While plaintiff and other employees were
preparing to serve the wine, a cap from one suddenly ejected and hit
the plaintiff in the eye, resulting in a serious injury. The trial court
determined that the suit was barred because of lack of privity between
the parties. On appeal, in Yengtzer v. Taylor Wine Co.,: the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the employee was a buyer under sec-
s'McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W. 2d 14
(1962) (host to guest in automobile), extended to all situations involving "tacit
assumption of risk" in Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 107, 120 N.W. 2d 63(1959).
32 WIs. STAT. §331.045 (1961).
33 Nelson v. Hanson, 10 Wis. 2d 107, 102 N.W. 2d 251 (1959).
34RESTATEMENT, TORTS §467 (1934).
3 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs, Note to Institute §402a (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964).
1414 Pa. 272, 199 A. 2d 463 (1964).
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